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Introduction
European countrics arc inçreasingly subject to two constraints on tho man agement of their public polîcy. The i'ir.st one is tho constraint on budget déf icits, forcing governmcnts to contrn! their total expenditures. The second one is the opinion shared by mosi of t.hr European countries, that compé tition in corporatc taxes would be harmfulr>. Indced, during the last twenty years, in a context of deeper trade intégration and capital mobility. governinonts hâve signifie an tly reduced their statutory corporatc tax rates to promote their attractiveness (sec Devereux, Griffilh and Klcmm, 2002 )(i. In a pessimistic scénario, this race to the bottom would rcsult in a lower level of tax incarne and suboptimal public expenditures l'or immobile houscholds (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 198(>) . Under the assumption that govcrnmonts are awarc of thèse négative offects, we eau autieipatc that, in the future, statutory corporatc tax rates will bc less frequently mauipulatcd to attract the firme. Tluis, Lhc existence of thèse two constraints suggests that the analysis of the allocation choice of public expenditures is particularly rele vant. This is the question wc raise in this article.
We wish to thank for their comments and suggestions participants at the 53rd congress of the RSAI in Tor onto, at the workshop 'régional agglomération, growlh, and multi-ievel governance' in Ghent, at the workshop 'EU countries in fiscal compétition' in Mannheim and at the 21 st annual congress of the EEA in Vienna.
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Soziallorschung (WZB) anci CREUSET-CNRS, Université de Saint-Etienne. Keen and Marchand (1997) and Mat sumoto (2000) analyzo the way compétition among governments distorts the patteru of public apending, but with the assuinption that the économies are perfectly integrated.
Our modol is based on the monopolise compétition framework with mobile firms and immobile housenalds deveïoped by Ottaviano and Vnn Yperscle (2005) . Public spe-uding lias two possible allocations: a direct subsidy to households or a, wage subsidy to mobile fini in. Shipping the good produced in the monopolistic compétitive sector is costly and we assume that; the labor prodiictivity in thïs sector is différent among countrics. Govcrnmeuts arc benevolent, they choose the allocation of their public spending so fis to maximize the welfare of the households. We neutralize tax compatit ion by assuming exogenous capital and labor taxes in order to isolate the impact of trade intégration on the choice of public spending. Nevortheless, with part of the tax base being mobile, tax revenues collected in each country are euciogenous.
We show thaï the firms receive a lower net of tax subsidy in the highproductivity country than in the low-produeiivity one. Despite this less gênerons policy, the former country eau host a larger share of firms, so that îts total spending for finns can be higher than in the low-productivity coun try when trade costs arc low enough. In tins case, households arc the netcontributors to the budget in both countrics. The welfare analysis suggests that the second-best optimum requires an increas<; in the subsidy to house holds in both countries when the économies arc weakly integrated or the prodiictivity gap ia low or the share of capital incomes redistributed outside the two économies is lngh.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, The model is deveïoped in the next section. In section 3. we investigate the spatial distribution of finns, the resulting subsidy equiiibrium and the composition of public 10 See the chapier 4 in the book al Baldwin et al. (2003) for an exhaustive présentation of the contribution o)
the New Economie Geography litoraturc to the analysis in 1he tax policies.
produeed in counlry r from a consumer living in country r (g,.,.) andeountry s with s# r (qra):
qyy -a -(b -h m) prr + cPT qr6 = « -(6 + cn)prs + cPs (3) where tt=ab. b=l/\0+(n-l)S\, c= ôh/(p-S) and /;,.,. (resp.. pra) îs thc price of a variety produeed in country r for consumers of country r (resp., s), Finally, Pr = nrj)rr + ««?«■ PS = «,./>,.* + V?,,/),4.,
are thc prier indices (i.c, n tinics thc average price) of varieties in country r and in country s, reapectively, with nT and ns the ninnbor of varieties/ firni.s located in r and s.
Private sector
Thc Brins from the traditional aector produce a hoiuogcneous good (the numéraire) under perfect compétition and constant rotnrns to scale. Onc unit of output requires one unit of labor. Thc T-good is traded without cost between countries 80 that ite price as wbII ay thc wage rate in that sector are vx\\v,\\ to uiiity in cach country l~. As workers arc mobile acroas sectors, the wage rate is also equaJ to 1 in the modem sector in both countries .
Each varîcty is produeed by a single firm in the modéra sector. Wc assume that the production of any variety requires a country-specifie fixed amount <pr of labor / with
In other words, we assume that country i has an advautage in ternis of productivity in the modéra sector . Moreover, varieties of the M-good are traded at. a cost of r units of the ninuériiirc per unit, shipped between thc two countries. As firms bear thèse brade costs, profits of a représentative firm in country r are as follows:
where /.,. is the unit tax in country /■ and fr is the subsidy receivcd by a firm established in country r for each worker it employa .
The Iraditional sector is periectly compétitive and firms in this sector are immobile. Hence, govornments hâve no incentive to give them a subsidy.
This resuit holds when the sector T is active in both countries. which we suppose to be checked.
It is necessary to normalize the marginal cost to zéro in order to get analytical results when solving (or the subsirjy choices made by governments. This assumption is also made by Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005) .
As the subsidy is linked to employmenl, it is not a simple tax déduction. This kind of subsidy is more and more advocated. For example, a récent report on government aid to private firms in France indicates lhat 43% of the publics funds allocated to firms are aimed at decreasing Ihe labor cost (cf. Inspection Générale, 2007).
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As we arc interestcd in the pattcrn of public oxpenditurcs, we considcr taxes as givcn. Public cxpcnditures and tax revenues are respcctivcly given by Gy=hrl + <p,-!,nY and Tr= prl+ trnr. Dcspito the exogencity of taxes, observe that tax revenues are endogenous as the firms are mobile. Moreover, since the budget constramt requires that G,. -Tr , we gct:
A.s taxes are exogenous, we will deal with the net subsidy received by firms ( Er) and workers (//,.}, that is:
HrsV Pr (10)
The redistributive property of governmcnts1 public policy appears through the equality (8). Indcod. as soon as workers receive a positive net subsidy ( Hr>0), they are the net beneficiary of the publie funds and as a conséquence the inercase in their subsidy raises the net contribution of firms to the public funds.
3
Nash subsidies and location equilibrium
Tho model conwists in a sequential game involving two main players, firms and governmcnts. In the first stage, each government simultancousfy chooses its wage subsidy for firms ff taking as givcn the décision of the other govern ment. and anticipating the impact of its décision on the private sector outcome and the location equilibrium. In stage 2. givcn the choiecs amiounced by governments, Firms choose their place of production. Ail players havo a perfect information and the game is solved by a sub-game perfect equilibrium involving backward induction beginning with tin; laat stage.
Location equilibrium
The location of firms in Hector M is governed by the spatial différence in net profits evaluated at equilibrium priées. At the location equilibrium. no firm is incited to change its location. Lei X m nx/n dénote the sharc of firms located in country f. Formally, an interior equilibrium X g (0;I) occurs if and only if A(/T) = 7Tr(X*) -fts(X*) = 0. The location forces driving this location eciuilibrium are the followïng. For given taxes and subsidies. the productivity advantage of country "I makes it more attractive. Nevertheless. By attractiug new firms, an increasc in fhe leveî of net subsidy to firms raises the numbor of varieties produced on the domostic market and intensifies price compétition (surplus effect). The sign of the redistributive effect dépends on whether the firms are net récipients (Er>0) or net contributors (Er< 0 ) of the public funds. The impact of an iucrease in Er on profils rcccivcd by résidents (profit effect) is alwo not obvious. If an increase in the net subsidy to finns directly improves its net profit, it also indirectly intensifies price compétition and thus damages ifs gross profit. The net effect is finally positive. The Nash cquilibrium is described by the following levels of net subsidy for finns: e; -ei = we > n.
El --B& -I-C(r) and E£ -B& -I-C(r)
Indeed. the low-productivity country sets a more generous public poltcy for each firm in order to limit its productivity disadvantage. Couseqncntly. a réduction in tlie productivity vvedge between countries dccrea.ses the international différence in net subsidies lo finns {ci(E.y -El)/d0> 0 ).
Additionally. the more important the share of profits that rcmains in the economy. the more similar tlie levels of net subsidv lo each firm are in each
Wilh lhe expression B, , we can define a condition on /. ensuring thaï at lhe Nash equi!ibrium, lhe net cosl of employing a worker is still posilivo ( l -/,' > 0 ). For counlries 1 and 2 respeclively, Ihese conditions are given by àt > /, -!W+ C and <;>, > L, + SB+ C. We assume they are fulllilled throughoul lhe analysis.
To sunuaarize:
Proposition 1 The govcmment of the, low-producMvïty country sets a higher level ofnet subsidy for eachfirm than in the high-productivity country, but attracts a minovity of firms.
The net subsidies received by households arc given by:
Hi-=Bpï imd Hi = -E^l-V".
They hâve the opposite sign to Er. Intuitivcly, the households are net boiieficîaiy fresp. net contributors) of tlio public fnuds if the firms are net contribuions (resp. tiet. récipients). TIlus, since Brins located in country 2 are always net récipients of tlie public fïmds { E., > 0 ). tlie hou.sehold.s living in tlii.s country pav always more taxes than the amount of subsidies they receive (//._,< 0 ). In country 1. the status of households with respect to the public expenditure polîcy îs more ambiguons. Il is indirectly relatcd to the international productivity wedge on the one hand, aud to the level of trade costb on the other hand. Indeed, wc gct [J* = {) if and only if:
Moreover, wc can easily chedk that 0"'jo1" > C{r)fU if and only if:
Thus, as soon as r < f (bo that 0a'Jfjl" < C \t) /I3), we gel ll\ < 0 for ail interior cquilibria.. Stated dif'fcreiitly, the liouseholds of the most pro ductive country are net contributors of the public funds when économies arc integratcd enough. Abovc the thrcshold f of trade costs, both configu rations can émerge depeuding on the size of the productivity wedge and the level of trade costs. To sum up:
Proposition 2 For ail interior equilibria, the households living in the low-produetivity country arc always net conlribuiovs of the public junds. By coutrasL, the households living in the high-prodiicl.ivity country become net récipients of the public funds provided that trade coêts and/or the produc tivity davantage are high enough.
Composition of public expenditures
We now analyze the aggregal.ed amount of public expenditures aliocated to firms and households in each country. Lel. A/C s X"uE\ -{1 -\")" nEd énote the international différence in aggregated net aubsidies to firniH. We gct:
parcd to those living in the other country. Thus, in the last stage of inté gration, trade agrecmcnts could improve tlie situation of households living in thc low-productivity country with respect to the public policy as compared to houscholds living in thc liigh-productivity country.
To summarizc:
Proposition 4 WT -W\ -h W2 = ST + HT + TLt (15) where ST= (À1, + S2)l describes the total consumers' surplus, HT= (Hl + H2)l represents thc total net subsidies to liouscliolds and { [-(■ s y{n\?[-\ -1-/(2^2) gives thc total net profits reccivod by thesc householda.
Let us first consider the externality acting through thc total consumers' surplus. So as to definc its aigtl and its magnitude, wc calculatc dST/dEr and evaluatc its value at thc Nash subsidy equilibrium. Wc get: dSi DE, < 0 and Nash 0E-> Nash ThilS, inercasing thc total consmners' surplus requires a coordinatod policy inercasing thc level of net subsidy to firins in thc low-productivity eountry and decreasing it in the other country. Statcd diffcrently, from thc consumers' point of view, thcrc is an excessive agglomération of firrns in the highproductivity country at the dcccntralizcd equilibrium. fndeed. when they décide on their levels of net subsidies, governments do not take into account thc impact of their choice on the spatial distribution of firms and in fine on the consumers' surplus in the other country.
Finally, observe that whatever the levels of trade co.sts and thc productivity wedge. the inefficiency of the public policy in the low-productivity country is always more important than in thc other country. Indced. we get:
OW-r 0E\ -\ fis 11 <)£■> Masli Tins resuit lias an important implication with respect to the spatial distribution of firnis. It hnplies that more agglomération in the high-productivity country is required in order to improve global welfare. This resuit is close to thc one of Ottaviano and Van Yperscle (2005) who use a similar framework. Assuming two countriea of différent market size, they show that in order to improve the ovcrall welfare, a réduction in the non-cooperative tax gap is necessary as it increases the agglomération of firms in the largest country. In othcr words, when a eountry benefits from a locational advantage, whether it coines from a lower production cost or a larger market size.
it seems that tho non-coopérative behavior of govemmeiits leads to a sub optimal degree of agglomération in this country because the govcrnment of the other country tries to improve its attractiveness by bcing more gencrous with firme.
Our hypothesis of partial redistribution of profits in the economy allows us to complète the welfare analysis of Ottaviano and van Yperselc (2005) . Assuming that ail profits remain in thc cconomy, they show that capital taxation is always set at an inefficicntly high level in the country bonefiting from a higher market size and at an inefficiently low level in tlie other country, Our analysis reveals that if a similar conclusion prevails for the public policy of the low-productivity country, it docs not hold for the other country where the level of net subsidy to firms at the Nash equilibrium can beconie too high from thc social welfare point of view when the share of profits repatriatcd outside the economy is important.
Proposition 5 At the non-coopérative equilibrium. the public expenditure policy cannot maximize global welfare: (i) in thc low-productivity country. the level of net subsidy to firms is too high compared to the level of net subsidy to households; (u) m the high-productivity country, the level of 'net subsidy to households is too high compared to the level of net subsidy to firms provided that a large fraction of profits rernains in thc cconomy or trade costs are low enougli.
